Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions

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Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions

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Title: Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions
Author: Kothari, Anshul; Parkes, David C.; Suri, Subhash

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Citation: Kothari, Anshul, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2005. Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. Decision Support Systems 39(1): 105-121. Previously published in Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: San Diego, California, USA, June 9-12, 2003. New York, N.Y.: ACM Press, 166-175.
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Abstract: We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant curves and quantity-based side constraints. We develop a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a (1+ε) approximation in worst-case time T=O(n3/ε), given n bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of O(T log n). The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by εV/(1+ε), where V is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.009
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