Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
MetadataShow full item record
CitationConstantin, Florin, Takayuki Ito, and David C. Parkes. 2007. Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. In Proceedings of the sixth international joint conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems 2007, AAMAS '07: May 14-18, 2007, Honolulu, Hawaii, ed. IFAAMAS, 110. New York, NY: ACM Press.
AbstractInterdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders' information. We investigate the incentive compatibility (IC) of single-item auctions for IDV bidders in dynamic environments. We provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for IC in this setting. We show that if bidders can misreport departure times and private signals, no reasonable auction can be IC. We present a reasonable IC auction for the case where bidders cannot misreport departures.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4039772
- FAS Scholarly Articles