Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

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Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

dc.contributor.author	Klein, Mark
dc.contributor.author	Moreno, Gabriel A.
dc.contributor.author	Parkes, David C.
dc.contributor.author	Plakosh, Daniel
dc.contributor.author	Seuken, Sven
dc.contributor.author	Wallnau, Kurt C.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-05-03T14:34:29Z
dc.date.issued	2008
dc.identifier.citation	Klein, Mark, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, and Kurt C. Wallnau. 2008. Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Economics of Networked Systems: August 22, 2008, Seattle, WA, ed. J. Feigenbaum; Y R. Yang, 73-78. New York, N.Y.: ACM Press.	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	978-1-60558-179-8	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4039780
dc.description.abstract	We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Engineering and Applied Sciences	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Association for Computing Machinery	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1403027.1403044	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/klein08.pdf	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.subject	interdependent values	en_US
dc.subject	mechanism design	en_US
dc.subject	sensor networks	en_US
dc.title	Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks	en_US
dc.type	Monograph or Book	en_US
dc.description.version	Accepted Manuscript	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Parkes, David C.
dc.date.available	2010-05-03T14:34:29Z