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dc.contributor.authorParkes, David C.
dc.contributor.authorKalagnanam, Jayant
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-03T14:39:02Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citationParkes, David C., and Jayant Kalagnanam. 2005. Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions. Management Science 51(3): 435-451.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4039783
dc.description.abstractMultiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear case-a particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEngineering and Applied Sciencesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherINFORMSen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/cap-sigops06.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanismen_US
dc.subjectex post Nash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectiterative auctionsen_US
dc.subjectmultiattribute negotiationen_US
dc.subjectprice-based feedbacken_US
dc.subjectprocurementen_US
dc.subjectstraightforward biddingen_US
dc.titleModels for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctionsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalManagement Scienceen_US
dash.depositing.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.available2010-05-03T14:39:02Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340*
dash.contributor.affiliatedParkes, David


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