Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations

Citable link to this page


Title: Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations
Author: Tarnita, Corina Elena; Antal, Tibor; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Tarnita Corina E., Tibor Antal, Hisashi Ohtsuki, Martin A. Nowak. 2009. Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations. Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences USA 106(21): 8601-8604.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful method to study dynamical population structure: evolutionary set theory. The individuals of a population are distributed over sets. Individuals interact with others who are in the same set. Any 2 individuals can have several sets in common. Some sets can be empty, whereas others have many members. Interactions occur in terms of an evolutionary game. The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness. Both the strategy and the set memberships change under evolutionary updating. Therefore, the population structure itself is a consequence of evolutionary dynamics. We construct a general mathematical approach for studying any evolutionary game in set structured populations. As a particular example, we study the evolution of cooperation and derive precise conditions for cooperators to be selected over defectors.
Published Version: doi:10.1073/pnas.0903019106
Other Sources: http://www.ped.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/all_publications.html#2009
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054429
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search