Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms

 
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Shneidman, Jeffery
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https://doi.org/10.1109/AAMAS.2004.108
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Parkes, David C., and Jeffrey Shneidman. 2004. Distributed implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. In AAMAS 2004: Proceedings of the third joint conference on autonomous and multiagent systems, July 19-24, 2004, New York City, New York, USA, ed. IEEE Computer Society, 261-268. Piscataway, N.J.: IEEE.
Abstract
Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner taking all decisions.We consider distributed implementations, in which the outcome is determined by the self-interested agents themselves. Clearly this introduces new opportunities for manipulation.We propose a number of principles to guide the distribution of computation, focusing in particular on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms for implementing outcomes that maximize total value across agents. Our solutions bring the complete implementation into an ex post Nash equilibrium.
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