Online Mechanisms

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Online Mechanisms

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Online Mechanisms
Author: Parkes, David C.
Citation: Parkes, David C. 2007. Online mechanisms. In Algorithmic Game Theory, ed. N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, 411-439. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Online mechanisms extend the methods of mechanism design to dynamic environments with multiple agents and private information. Decisions must be made as information about types is revealed online and without knowledge of the future in the sense of online algorithms. We first consider single-valued preference domains and characterize the space of decision policies that can be truthfully implemented in a dominant strategy equilibrium. Working in a model-free environment we present truthful auctions for domains with expiring items and limited-supply items. Turning to a more general preference domain, and assuming the existence of a probabilistic model for agent types, we define a dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism that is efficient and Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We close with some thoughts about future research directions in this area.
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/online07.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4062502
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters