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dc.contributor.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-06T19:03:32Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationParkes, David C. 2007. Online mechanisms. In Algorithmic Game Theory, ed. N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, 411-439. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9780521872829en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4062502
dc.description.abstractOnline mechanisms extend the methods of mechanism design to dynamic environments with multiple agents and private information. Decisions must be made as information about types is revealed online and without knowledge of the future in the sense of online algorithms. We first consider single-valued preference domains and characterize the space of decision policies that can be truthfully implemented in a dominant strategy equilibrium. Working in a model-free environment we present truthful auctions for domains with expiring items and limited-supply items. Turning to a more general preference domain, and assuming the existence of a probabilistic model for agent types, we define a dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism that is efficient and Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We close with some thoughts about future research directions in this area.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEngineering and Applied Sciencesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/online07.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleOnline Mechanismsen_US
dc.typeMonograph or Booken_US
dc.description.versionProofen_US
dash.depositing.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.available2010-05-06T19:03:32Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedParkes, David


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