Transforming the Dilemma

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Transforming the Dilemma

Citable link to this page


Title: Transforming the Dilemma
Author: Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Nowak, Martin A.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Taylor, Christine, and Martin A. Nowak. 2007. Transforming the dilemma. Evolution 61(10): 2281-2292.
Access Status: Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time (“dark deposit”). For more information on dark deposits, see our FAQ.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: How does natural selection lead to cooperation between competing individuals? The Prisoner's Dilemma captures the essence of this problem. Two players can either cooperate or defect. The payoff for mutual cooperation, R, is greater than the payoff for mutual defection, P. But a defector versus a cooperator receives the highest payoff, T, where as the cooperator obtains the lowest payoff, S. Hence, the Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by the payoff ranking T > R > P > S . In a well-mixed population, defectors always have a higher expected payoff than cooperators, and therefore natural selection favors defectors. The evolution of cooperation requires specific mechanisms. Here we discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity (or graph selection). Each mechanism leads to a transformation of the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix. From the transformed matrices, we derive the fundamental conditions for the evolution of cooperation. The transformed matrices can be used in standard frameworks of evolutionary dynamics such as the replicator equation or stochastic processes of game dynamics in finite populations.
Published Version: doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00196.x
Other Sources:
Citable link to this page:
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search