Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions
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https://doi.org/10.1145/779928.779965Metadata
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Sunderam, Aditya V. and David C. Parkes. 2003. Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. In EC'03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce: June 9-12, 2003, San Diego, California, ed. Association for Computing Machinery, 214-215. New York: ACM Press.Abstract
We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-based multiattribute auctions, with proxy bidding agents that sit between the auctioneer and the participants. Empirical results demonstrate the preference elicitation savings that are provided with minimal price spaces, asynchronous updates, and proxy agents.Citable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4099602
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