An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design

DSpace/Manakin Repository

An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design
Author: Parkes, David C.; Singh, Satinder

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Parkes, David C., and Satinder Singh. 2004. An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. In Advances in neural information processing systems 16: Proceedings of the 2003 conference, ed. S. Thrun, L. K. Saul, and B. Schölkopf. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for di erent outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total long-term value of the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Published Version: http://books.nips.cc/nips16.html
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/mdp_omd03.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4100619
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters