An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design
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CitationParkes, David C., and Satinder Singh. 2004. An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. In Advances in neural information processing systems 16: Proceedings of the 2003 conference, ed. S. Thrun, L. K. Saul, and B. Schölkopf. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.
AbstractOnline mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for di erent outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total long-term value of the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4100619
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