Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions

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Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions

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Title: Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
Author: Parkes, David C.
Citation: Parkes, David C. 2002. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems, ed. J. A Padget, 253-276. Berlin; New York: Springer. Previously published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2531: 253-276.
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Abstract: The equilibrium of the direct-revelation Vickrey-Clarke- Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions requires every agent to provide complete information about its preferences. Not only is this unreasonable in settings with costly preference evaluation, but moreover it is often possible to implement the same outcome with incomplete preference information. We formalize the problem of minimal-revelation mechanism design and introduce the concept of minimal information certificates. Linear programming duality theory proves that a class of price-based information certificates are both necessary and sufficient to compute an efficient allocation in a dominant strategy mechanism.
Published Version: doi:10.1007/3-540-36378-5
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/certificates.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101006
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