Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: Issues in Online Mechanism Design
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CitationFriedman, Eric, and David C. Parkes. 2003. Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: Issues in online mechanism design. In EC '03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: June 9-12, 2003, San Diego, C.A., 240-241. New York: ACM Press.
AbstractWe consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and truthfully announce their arrival. These problems are becoming extremely common in a wide variety of problems involving wireless networking and webserving. We show how the standard results of mechanism design can be modified to apply to this setting, provide conditions under which efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms exist and analyze several important online models including wireless networks and web serving.
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