Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation
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CitationWoodard, Jason, and David C. Parkes. 2003. Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation. Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems in Berkeley C.A., June 5-6, 2003.
AbstractAgents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper explores the use of mechanism design techniques to offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101255
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