Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation
| Title: | Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation |
| Author: |
Woodard, Jason; Parkes, David C.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Woodard, Jason, and David C. Parkes. 2003. Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation. Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems in Berkeley C.A., June 5-6, 2003. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Woodard_Strategyproof.pdf (89.31Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper explores the use of mechanism design techniques to offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties. |
| Published Version: | http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/p2pecon/ |
| Other Sources: | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/woodard03adhoc.pdf |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101255 |
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