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dc.contributor.authorWoodard, Jason
dc.contributor.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-18T18:16:52Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.citationWoodard, Jason, and David C. Parkes. 2003. Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation. Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems in Berkeley C.A., June 5-6, 2003.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101255
dc.description.abstractAgents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper explores the use of mechanism design techniques to offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEngineering and Applied Sciencesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/p2pecon/en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/woodard03adhoc.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleStrategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formationen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dash.depositing.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.available2010-05-18T18:16:52Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedParkes, David


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