An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
Ungar, Lyle H.
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CitationParkes, David C., and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Paper presented at the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop: The Economics of the Internet: June 25-29, 2002.
AbstractA simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to
compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads
to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc-
tion, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps
non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the ef-
cient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium.
Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the
Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium.
The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which
provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust
the nal prices and implement Vickrey payments.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101692
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