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dc.contributor.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-18T19:08:11Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.identifier.citationParkes, David C. 2001. An iterative generalized Vickrey auction: Strategy-proofness without complete revelation. In Game theoretic and decision theoretic agents: Papers from the 2001 AAAI symposium: March 26-28, Stanford, California, ed. S. Parsons, 78-87. Menlo Park, C.A.: AAAI Press.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781577351313en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101696
dc.description.abstractThe generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) is a strategy-proof combinatorial auction, in which truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for an agent. In this paper we address a fundamental problem with the GVA, which is that it requires agents to compute and reveal their values for all combinations of items. This can be very difficult for bounded-rational agents with limited or costly computation. We propose an experimental design for an iterative combinatorial auction. We have a theoretical proof that the the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in special cases, and initial experimental results support our conjecture that the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in all cases. The auction has better information properties than the sealedbid GVA: in each round agents must only bid for the set of bundles that maximize their utility given current ask prices, which does not require agents to compute their exact values for every bundle.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEngineering and Applied Sciencesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAssociation for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligenceen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/2001/SS-01-03/SS01-03-010.pdfen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/ivickrey01.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleAn Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelationen_US
dc.typeMonograph or Booken_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dash.depositing.authorParkes, David C.
dc.date.available2010-05-18T19:08:11Z
dc.identifier.doi10.pdf*
dash.contributor.affiliatedParkes, David


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