Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What Is Possible
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CitationPhillips, Jonathan, and Fiery Cushman. 2017. Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What Is Possible. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 114, no. 18: 4649–4654.
AbstractThe capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41073761
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