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dc.contributor.authorPhillips, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorCushman, Fiery
dc.contributor.authorPhillips, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-05T16:08:48Z
dc.date.issued2017-04-18
dc.identifier.citationPhillips, Jonathan, and Fiery Cushman. 2017. Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What Is Possible. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 114, no. 18: 4649–4654.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424en_US
dc.identifier.issn1091-6490en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41073761*
dc.description.abstractThe capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPsychologyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectmodalityen_US
dc.subjecthigh-level cognitionen_US
dc.subjectmoralityen_US
dc.subjectnormsen_US
dc.subjectpossibilityen_US
dc.titleMorality Constrains the Default Representation of What Is Possibleen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)en_US
dash.depositing.authorCushman, Fiery
dc.date.available2019-08-05T16:08:48Z
dash.workflow.commentsFAR2017en_US
dash.funder.nameOffice of Naval Researchen_US
dash.funder.awardN00014-14-1-0800en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1073/pnas.1619717114
dc.source.journalProc Natl Acad Sci USA
dash.source.volume114;18
dash.source.page4649-4654
dash.contributor.affiliatedCushman, Fiery


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