The Problem of God's Knowledge of Particulars in Avicennan and Post-Avicennan Thought
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Gocheva, Lidia M.
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CitationGocheva, Lidia M. 2018. The Problem of God's Knowledge of Particulars in Avicennan and Post-Avicennan Thought. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.
AbstractThis dissertation begins with a discussion of the problem of God’s knowledge of particulars in Avicenna’s (d. 1037) thought, demonstrating a gradual shift in his treatment of the subject. The subsequent chapters present an overview of the way a number of leading philosophers and theologians of the following two centuries responded to Avicenna’s writings on God’s knowledge, with special attention to the highly controversial issue of whether and how God can know particulars, such as individual human beings.
More specifically, the second chapter analyzes the work of Avicenna’s followers Bahmanyār (d. 1066) and Lawkarī (d. ca. 1123), as well as of Abū ‘l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s (d. 1165) critical response and the counter-response it incited. The third chapter focuses on three theological critiques by Ghazālī (d. 1111), Shahrastānī (d. 1153), and Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d.1141), discussing the way their ideologies have affected the exact criticisms they leveled against Avicenna. The final chapter offers a study of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1209) thought on the extent of God’s knowledge, with emphasis on his indebtedness to earlier scholars discussed in the previous chapters. Two overarching themes traced throughout the dissertation are the diverse views on the nature of knowledge and the formation of a multifaceted post-Avicennan intellectual tradition.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41121193
- FAS Theses and Dissertations 
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