Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Non-Uniform Interaction Rates

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Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Non-Uniform Interaction Rates

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Title: Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Non-Uniform Interaction Rates
Author: Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Nowak, Martin A.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Taylor, Christine, and Martin A. Nowak. 2006. Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates. Theoretical Population Biology 69(3): 243-252.
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Abstract: The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework by allowing the interaction rates to depend on the strategies. This extension leads to non-linear fitness functions. We show that a strict Nash equilibrium remains uninvadable for non-uniform interaction rates, but the conditions for evolutionary stability need to be modified. We analyze all games between two strategies. If the two strategies coexist or exclude each other, then the evolutionary dynamics do not change qualitatively, only the location of the equilibrium point changes. If, however, one strategy dominates the other in the classical setting, then the introduction of non-uniform interaction rates can lead to a pair of interior equilibria. For the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-uniform interaction rates allow the coexistence between cooperators and defectors. For the snowdrift game, non-uniform interaction rates change the equilibrium frequency of cooperators.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.06.009
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4133282
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