Perception, action, and word meanings in the human brain: the case from action verbs
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CitationBedny, Marina, and Alfonso Caramazza. 2011. “Perception, Action, and Word Meanings in the Human Brain: The Case from Action Verbs.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1224 (1): 81–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06013.x.
AbstractAmong other things, humans talk about what they perceive and do, like "glowing," "hopping," and "squeaking." What is the relationship between our sensory-motor experiences and word meanings? Does understanding action-verbs rely on the same neural circuits as seeing and acting? The available evidence Indicates that sensory-motor experience and word meanings are represented in distinct, but interacting systems. Understanding action-verbs does not rely on early modality-specific visual or motor circuits. Instead, word comprehension relies on a network of amodal brain regions in the left frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices that represent conceptual and grammatical properties of words. Interactions between word meanings and sensory-motor experiences occur in higher-order polymodal brain regions.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41384820
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