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dc.contributor.authorCohen, Lauren
dc.contributor.authorCoval, Joshua
dc.contributor.authorMalloy, Christopher
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-29T12:32:53Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationCohen, Lauren, Joshua Coval, and Christopher Malloy. 2011. “Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?” Journal of Political Economy 119 (6): 1015–60. https://doi.org/10.1086/664820.
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808
dc.identifier.issn1537-534X
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41426665*
dc.description.abstractThis paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanships as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. We show that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate investment activity. This retrenchment occurs within large and small states and is most pronounced among geographically concentrated firms. The effects are economically meaningful, and the mechanism-entirely distinct from interest rate and tax channels-suggests new considerations in assessing the impact of government spending on private-sector economic activity.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleDo Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journalJournal of Political Economy
dash.depositing.authorMalloy, Christopher James::cb406dad7def5d3535270cfdfc69cad1::600
dc.date.available2019-09-29T12:32:53Z
dash.workflow.comments1Science Serial ID 54077
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/664820
dash.source.volume119;6
dash.source.page1015-1060


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