Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior
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https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.3.277Metadata
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Kaplow, Louis. 2011. “Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior.” American Economic Review 101 (3): 277–80. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.3.277.Terms of Use
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