| dc.contributor.author | Kaplow, Louis | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-29T12:34:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Kaplow, Louis. 2011. “Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior.” American Economic Review 101 (3): 277–80. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.3.277. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1944-7981 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41426671 | * |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | American Economic Association | |
| dash.license | OAP | |
| dc.title | Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior | |
| dc.type | Journal Article | |
| dc.description.version | Accepted Manuscript | |
| dc.relation.journal | American Economic Review | |
| dash.depositing.author | Kaplow, Louis::627fd7dda6e9f2174a0b8438d1bb2787::600 | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-09-29T12:34:39Z | |
| dash.workflow.comments | 1Science Serial ID 1202 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.101.3.277 | |
| dash.source.volume | 101;3 | |
| dash.source.page | 277-280 | |
