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dc.contributor.authorKaplow, Louis
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-29T12:34:39Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationKaplow, Louis. 2011. “Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior.” American Economic Review 101 (3): 277–80. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.3.277.
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.issn1944-7981
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41426671*
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleOptimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Review
dash.depositing.authorKaplow, Louis::627fd7dda6e9f2174a0b8438d1bb2787::600
dc.date.available2019-09-29T12:34:39Z
dash.workflow.comments1Science Serial ID 1202
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/aer.101.3.277
dash.source.volume101;3
dash.source.page277-280


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