Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAvery, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorLevin, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-29T12:36:49Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationAvery, Christopher, and Jonathan Levin. 2010. “Early Admissions at Selective Colleges.” American Economic Review 100 (5): 2125–56. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2125.
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.issn1944-7981
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41426682*
dc.description.abstractEarly admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleEarly Admissions at Selective Colleges
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Review
dash.depositing.authorAvery, Christopher N.::5997c9e4bb0772246ce869794703c89d::600
dc.date.available2019-09-29T12:36:49Z
dash.workflow.comments1Science Serial ID 1183
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/aer.100.5.2125
dash.source.volume100;5
dash.source.page2125-2156


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record