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dc.contributor.authorFernandez, Raquel
dc.contributor.authorRodrik, Dani
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-29T12:36:52Z
dc.date.issued1991
dc.identifier.citationFernandez, Raquel, and Dani Rodrik. 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty." American Economic Review 81(5): 1146-1155.
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.issn1944-7981
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41426688*
dc.description.abstractWhy do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency-enhancing? Our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform. We show that there is a bias towards the status quo (and hence against efficiency-enhancing reforms) whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand. There are reforms which, once adopted, will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante. The argument does not rely on risk aversion, irrationality, or hysteresis due to sunk costs.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleResistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.description.versionVersion of Record
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Review
dash.depositing.authorRodrik, Dani::ab392a3b159013e154b412ad0f604247::600
dc.date.available2019-09-29T12:36:52Z
dash.workflow.comments1Science Serial ID 1037
dash.source.volume81;5
dash.source.page1146-1155


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