Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange
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CitationBalbuzanov, Ivan, and Maciej H. Kotowski. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange." Econometrica 87, no. 5 (2019): 1663-692.
AbstractWe propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource-allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private, public, and mixed ownership. It is neither weaker nor stronger than the strong core.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41808543
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