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dc.contributor.authorKim, Hyunjin
dc.contributor.authorLuca, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-13T11:36:41Z
dc.date.issued2019-02
dc.identifier.citationKim, Hyunjin, and Michael Luca. "Product Quality and Entering Through Tying: Experimental Evidence." Management Science 65, no. 2 (February 2019): 596–603.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42046486*
dc.description.abstractDominant platform businesses often develop products in adjacent markets to complement their core business. One common approach used to gain traction in these adjacent markets has been to pursue a tying strategy. For example, Microsoft pre-installed Internet Explorer into Windows, and Apple set Apple Maps as the iOS default. Policymakers have raised concerns that dominant platforms may be leveraging their market power to gain traction for lower quality products when they use a tying strategy. In this paper, we empirically explore this question by examining Google’s decision to tie its new reviews product to its search engine. We experimentally vary the reviews displayed above Google’s organic search results to show either exclusively Google reviews (Google’s current tying strategy) or reviews from multiple platforms determined to be the best-performing by Google’s own organic search algorithm. We find that users prefer the version that does not exclude competitor reviews. Furthermore, looking at observational data on user traffic to Yelp from search engines, we find that Google’s exclusion of downstream competitors may have been effective. The share of Yelp’s traffic coming from Google has declined over this period, relative to traffic from Bing and Yahoo (which do not exclude other companies’ reviews), and Google reviews has grown quicker than Yelp and TripAdvisor during the period in which they excluded these (and other) reviews providers. Overall, these results shed light on platform strategy: tying has the potential to facilitate entry in complementary markets, even when the tied product is of worse quality than competitors.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3246en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectManagement Science and Operations Researchen_US
dc.subjectStrategy and Managementen_US
dc.subjectProducten_US
dc.subjectQualityen_US
dc.subjectMarket Platformsen_US
dc.subjectMarket Entry and Exiten_US
dc.subjectTyingen_US
dc.subjectPlatform Strategyen_US
dc.subjectGoogleen_US
dc.titleProduct Quality and Entering Through Tying: Experimental Evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalManagement Scienceen_US
dash.depositing.authorLuca, Michael
dc.date.available2019-12-13T11:36:41Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2018.3246
dc.source.journalManagement Science
dash.source.volume65;2
dash.source.page596-603
dash.contributor.affiliatedKim, Hyunjin
dash.contributor.affiliatedLuca, Michael


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