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dc.contributor.authorHeese, Jonas
dc.contributor.authorKrishnan, Ranjani
dc.contributor.authorMoers, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-22T10:53:10Z
dc.date.issued2016-12
dc.identifier.citationHeese, Jonas, Ranjani Krishnan, and Frank Moers. "Selective Regulator Decoupling and Organizations' Strategic Responses." Academy of Management Journal 59, no. 6 (December 2016).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0001-4273en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42668738*
dc.description.abstractOrganizations often respond to institutional pressures by symbolically adopting policies and procedures but decoupling them from actual practice. Literature has examined why organizations decouple from regulatory pressures. In this study, we argue that decoupling occurs within regulatory agencies and results from a combination of conflicting institutional pressures, complex goals, and internal fragmentation. Further, regulatory decoupling is selective, i.e., regulators fail to adequately enforce standards only for one set of organizations. Regulated organizations that benefit from selective regulatory decoupling use non-market strategies to maintain their favorable regulatory status and in the process selectively decouple their norms in one organizational activity but not others. As an empirical context, we use the hospital industry where regulators have to balance conflicting pressures to be tough on fraud, while maintaining the community’s access to essential but unprofitable services such as charity care and medical education. In response, hospital regulators selectively decouple and exhibit leniency in enforcement of mispricing practices towards beneficent hospitals, defined as hospitals that provide more charity care and medical education. In turn, beneficent hospitals selectively decouple their service and profit goals by providing unprofitable services to uninsured patients, while mispricing insured patients to earn higher reimbursements.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAcademy of Managementen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0446en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectManagement of Technology and Innovationen_US
dc.subjectStrategy and Managementen_US
dc.subjectGeneral Business, Management and Accountingen_US
dc.subjectBusiness and International Managementen_US
dc.subjectNonprofit Organizationsen_US
dc.subjectHealth Care and Treatmenten_US
dc.subjectRevenueen_US
dc.subjectMispricingen_US
dc.subjectUpcodingen_US
dc.subjectBeneficenceen_US
dc.subjectRegulator Leniencyen_US
dc.titleSelective Regulator Decoupling and Organizations’ Strategic Responsesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalAcademy of Management Journalen_US
dash.depositing.authorHeese, Jonas
dc.date.available2020-05-22T10:53:10Z
dc.identifier.doi10.5465/amj.2015.0446
dc.source.journalAMJ
dash.source.volume59;6
dash.source.page2178-2204
dash.contributor.affiliatedHeese, Jonas


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