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dc.contributor.authorSOLTES, EUGENE
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-29T15:45:46Z
dc.date.issued2013-12-31
dc.identifier.citationSoltes, Eugene F. "Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell-Side Analysts." Journal of Accounting Research 52, no. 1 (March 2014): 245–272.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0021-8456en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42668885*
dc.description.abstractAlthough sell-side analysts often privately interact with managers of publicly traded firms, the private nature of this contact has historically obscured direction examination. By examining a set of proprietary records compiled by a large-cap NYSE traded firm, I offer insights into which analysts privately meet with management, when analysts privately interact with management, and why these interactions occur. I also compare private interaction to public interaction between analysts and managers on conference calls. The evidence suggests that private interaction with management is an important communication channel for analysts for reasons other than firm-specific forecasting news.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12037en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectEconomics and Econometricsen_US
dc.subjectAccountingen_US
dc.subjectFinanceen_US
dc.subjectInterpersonal Communicationen_US
dc.titlePrivate Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell-Side Analystsen_US
dc.title.alternativePRIVATE INTERACTION
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Accounting Researchen_US
dash.depositing.authorSOLTES, EUGENE
dc.date.available2020-05-29T15:45:46Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-679x.12037
dc.source.journalJournal of Accounting Research
dash.source.volume52;1
dash.source.page245-272
dash.contributor.affiliatedSoltes, Eugene


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