The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: One State's Model for Gerrymandering Reform
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CitationMathis, Colleen, Daniel Moskowitz, and Benjamin Schneer. "The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: One State's Model for Gerrymandering Reform." Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2019.
AbstractIndependent redistricting in practice has proven remarkably successful along several dimensions. This policy brief outlines key lessons learned from redistricting in Arizona, a state with a five-person independent redistricting commission. Based on a mix of empirical evidence and first-hand experience, we argue that Arizona’s approach to redistricting increases transparency through public engagement and participation in the mapping process; fosters increased competition in districts, which has several effects thought to be beneficial for democratic representation; contributes to higher levels of compactness (i.e., how far the district extends from its center) in newly-drawn districts and promotes partisan fairness in the state as a whole; and benefits from its multi-partisan composition and ought to be insulated from legislative interference.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42671418
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