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dc.contributor.authorHauert, Christoph
dc.contributor.authorTraulsen, Arne
dc.contributor.authorBrandt, Hannelore
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.contributor.authorSigmund, Karl
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-12T13:26:19Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationHauert, Christoph, Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak, and Karl Sigmund. 2007. Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science 316(5833): 1905-1907.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0036-8075en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4341693
dc.description.abstractIn human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable—once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Association for the Advancement of Scienceen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1126/science.1141588en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ped/people/faculty/publications_nowak/science07.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectevolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.subjectpublic goods gamesen_US
dc.subjectcooperationen_US
dc.subjectaltruistic punishmenten_US
dc.subjectvoluntary interactionsen_US
dc.titleVia Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishmenten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalScienceen_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available2010-08-12T13:26:19Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1126/science.1141588*
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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