Learning and Equilibrium

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Learning and Equilibrium

Citable link to this page


Title: Learning and Equilibrium
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2009. Learning and equilibrium. Annual Review of Economics 1: 385–420.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: The theory of learning in games studies how, which and what kind of
equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run non-equilibrium process of learning, adaptation and/or imitation. If agents’ strategies are completely observed at the end of each round, and agents are randomly matched with a series of anonymous opponents, fairly simple rules perform well in terms of the agent’s worst-case payoffs, and also guarantee that any steady state of the system must correspond to an equilibrium. If (as in extensive-form games) players do not observe the strategies chosen by their opponents, then learning is consistent with steady states that are not Nash equilibria because players can maintain incorrect beliefs about off-path play. Beliefs can also be
incorrect due to cognitive limitations and systematic inferential errors.
Published Version: doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142930
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4382413
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search