| dc.contributor.author | Berker, Selim | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-24T18:53:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Berker, Ahmet Selim. 2011. Gupta’s gambit. Philosophical Studies 152(1): 17-39. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8116 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1573-0883 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4391333 | |
| dc.description.abstract | After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book Empiricism and Experience, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world. | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9435-1 | en_US |
| dash.license | OAP | |
| dc.subject | Gupta | en_US |
| dc.subject | empiricism | en_US |
| dc.subject | the given | en_US |
| dc.subject | experience | en_US |
| dc.subject | entitlement | en_US |
| dc.subject | interdependence | en_US |
| dc.title | Gupta’s Gambit | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
| dc.description.version | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Philosophical Studies | en_US |
| dash.depositing.author | Berker, Selim | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-08-24T18:53:08Z | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11098-009-9435-1 | * |
| dash.contributor.affiliated | Berker, Selim | |
