Designing for Incentives: Better Information Sharing for Better Software Engineering
Moreno, Gabriel A.
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CitationKlein, Mark, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, and Kurt Wallnau. Forthcoming. Designing for incentives: Better information sharing for better software engineering. Proceedings of FSE Workshop on the Future of Software Engineering: November 7-8, 2010, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
AbstractSoftware-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society. The resulting interconnectedness and associated com- plexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals. Thus, contemporary software engi- neering is plagued by incentive conflicts, in settling on design features, allocating resources during the development of products, and allocating computational resources at run- time. In this position paper, we describe some of these problems and outline a research agenda in bridging to the economic theory of mechanism design, which seeks to align incentives in multi-agent systems with private information and conflicting goals. The ultimate goal is to advance a principled methodology for the design of incentive-compatible approaches to manage the dynamic processes of software engineering.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4434400
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