Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms
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CitationParkes, David C., Ruggiero Cavallo, Florin Constantin, and Satinder Singh. Forthcoming. Dynamic incentive mechanisms. Artificial Intelligence Magazine.
AbstractMuch of AI is concerned with the design of
intelligent agents. A complementary challenge
is to understand how to design “rules of encounter”
(Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) by which
to promote simple, robust and beneficial interactions
between multiple intelligent agents. This is
a natural development, as AI is increasingly used
for automated decision making in real-world settings.
As we extend the ideas of mechanism design
from economic theory, the mechanisms (or rules)
become algorithmic and many new challenges surface.
Starting with a short background on mechanism
design theory, the aim of this paper is to provide
a non-technical exposition of recent results
on dynamic incentive mechanisms, which provide
rules for the coordination of agents in sequential
decision problems. The framework of dynamic
mechanism design embraces coordinated decision
making both in the context of uncertainty about
the world external to an agent and also in regard
to the dynamics of agent preferences. In addition
to tracing some recent developments, we point to
ongoing research challenges.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481299
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