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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorRodrik, Dani
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-08T21:48:17Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik. 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 2: 465-490.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4551798
dc.description.abstractWe study the relationship between politics and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among agents endowed with varying capital/labor shares. We establish several results regarding the factor ownership of the median individual and the level of taxation, redistribution, and growth. Policies that maximize growth are optimal only for a government that cares solely about pure "capitalists." The greater the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower growth. We present empirical results that show that inequality in land and income ownership is negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMIT Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118470en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleDistributive Politics and Economic Growthen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalQuarterly Journal of Economicsen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-08T21:48:17Z
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/2118470*
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto
dash.contributor.affiliatedRodrik, Dani


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