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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T18:44:13Z
dc.date.issued1987
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto. 1987. Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(3): 651-678.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4552531
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMIT Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884222en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleMacroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Gameen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalQuarterly Journal of Economicsen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T18:44:13Z
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/1884222*
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


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