Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations
| Title: | Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations |
| Author: |
Spolaore, Enrico; Alesina, Alberto
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2006. Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. European Economic Review 50(1): 91-120. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
alesina_conflictdefense.pdf (1.629Mb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup. |
| Published Version: | doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.06.003 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553016 |
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