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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorSpolaore, Enrico
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T19:42:23Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2006. Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. European Economic Review 50(1): 91-120.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553016
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.06.003en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectconflicten_US
dc.subjectbordersen_US
dc.subjectsize of nationsen_US
dc.subjectLeviathansen_US
dc.titleConflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nationsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalEuropean Economic Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T19:42:23Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.06.003*
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


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