Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies

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Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies

Show simple item record Roubini, Nouriel Cohen, Gerald Alesina, Alberto 2010-11-09T20:09:51Z 1992
dc.identifier.citation Alesina, Alberto, Gerald D. Cohen, and Nouriel Roubini. 1992. Macroeconomic policy and elections in OECD democracies. Economics & Politics 4(1): 1-30. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0954-1985 en_US
dc.description.abstract The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic "political business cycles" in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of "political monetary cycles," that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of "political budget cycles," or "loose" fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral "loose" monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Blackwell Publishing en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00052.x en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.title Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Author's Original en_US
dc.relation.journal Economics & Politics en_US Alesina, Alberto 2010-11-09T20:09:51Z

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