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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorPerotti, Roberto
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T20:22:49Z
dc.date.issued1997
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1997. The welfare state and competitiveness. American Economic Review 87(5): 921-939.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553027
dc.description.abstractIn all industrial countries, fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution. In this paper, we study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. We show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries, depending on the degree of centralization of the wage-setting process in the labor market. We find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of 14 OECD countries.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2951333en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleThe Welfare State and Competitivenessen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T20:22:49Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


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