Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorDrazen, Allan
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T20:25:02Z
dc.date.issued1988
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen. 1991. Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review 81(5): 1170-1188.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553028
dc.description.abstractWhen a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2006912en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleWhy Are Stabilizations Delayed?en_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T20:25:02Z
dc.identifier.doi10.3386/w3053
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record