Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection

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Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection

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dc.contributor.author Imhof, Lorens A.
dc.contributor.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.author Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-11-15T20:27:21Z
dc.date.issued 2005
dc.identifier.citation Imhof, Lorens A., Drew Fudenberg, Martin A. Nowak. 2005. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 102(31): 10797-10800. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0027-8424 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4554745
dc.description.abstract The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics of three simple strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: always defect (ALLD), always cooperate (ALLC), and tit-for-tat (TFT). We study mutation–selection dynamics in finite populations. Despite ALLD being the only strict Nash equilibrium, we observe evolutionary oscillations among all three strategies. The population cycles from ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back to ALLD. Most surprisingly, the time average of these oscillations can be entirely concentrated on TFT. In contrast to the classical expectation, which is informed by deterministic evolutionary game theory of infinitely large populations, stochastic evolution of finite populations need not choose the strict Nash equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Mathematics en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Organismic and Evolutionary Biology en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher National Academy of Sciences en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1073/pnas.0502589102 en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.subject evolutionary dynamics en_US
dc.subject finite population en_US
dc.subject prisoner's dilemma en_US
dc.subject reciprocity en_US
dc.subject stochastic process en_US
dc.title Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript en_US
dc.relation.journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America en_US
dash.depositing.author Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available 2010-11-15T20:27:21Z

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