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dc.contributor.authorImhof, Lorens A.
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T20:27:21Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citationImhof, Lorens A., Drew Fudenberg, Martin A. Nowak. 2005. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 102(31): 10797-10800.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4554745
dc.description.abstractThe main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics of three simple strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: always defect (ALLD), always cooperate (ALLC), and tit-for-tat (TFT). We study mutation–selection dynamics in finite populations. Despite ALLD being the only strict Nash equilibrium, we observe evolutionary oscillations among all three strategies. The population cycles from ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back to ALLD. Most surprisingly, the time average of these oscillations can be entirely concentrated on TFT. In contrast to the classical expectation, which is informed by deterministic evolutionary game theory of infinitely large populations, stochastic evolution of finite populations need not choose the strict Nash equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1073/pnas.0502589102en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectevolutionary dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectfinite populationen_US
dc.subjectprisoner's dilemmaen_US
dc.subjectreciprocityen_US
dc.subjectstochastic processen_US
dc.titleEvolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defectionen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of Americaen_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available2010-11-15T20:27:21Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1073/pnas.0502589102*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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