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dc.contributor.authorImhof, Lorens A.
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T20:29:44Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationImhof Lorens A., Martin A. Nowak. 2010. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 277(1680): 463-468.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0962-8452en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4554746
dc.description.abstractEvolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection. The success of an individual depends on the frequencies of strategies that are used in the population. We propose a new model for studying evolutionary dynamics in games with a continuous strategy space. The population size is finite. All members of the population use the same strategy. A mutant strategy is chosen from some distribution over the strategy space. The fixation probability of the mutant strategy in the resident population is calculated. The new mutant takes over the population with this probability. In this case, the mutant becomes the new resident. Otherwise, the existing resident remains. Then, another mutant is generated. These dynamics lead to a stationary distribution over the entire strategy space. Our new approach generalizes classical adaptive dynamics in three ways: (i) the population size is finite; (ii) mutants can be drawn non-locally and (iii) the dynamics are stochastic. We explore reactive strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We perform ‘knock-out experiments’ to study how various strategies affect the evolution of cooperation. We find that ‘tit-for-tat’ is a weak catalyst for the emergence of cooperation, while ‘always cooperate’ is a strong catalyst for the emergence of defection. Our analysis leads to a new understanding of the optimal level of forgiveness that is needed for the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherRoyal Society, Theen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1098/rspb.2009.1171en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.ped.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/all_publications.html#2010en_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.subjectcooperationen_US
dc.subjectfinite populationen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectmathematical biologyen_US
dc.subjectPrisoner's Dilemmaen_US
dc.titleStochastic Evolutionary Dynamics of Direct Reciprocityen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the Royal Society of London Ben_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1098/rspb.2009.1171*
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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