Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHauert, Christoph
dc.contributor.authorTraulsen, Arne
dc.contributor.authorBrandt, Hannelore
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.contributor.authorSigmund, Karl
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T20:32:23Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationHauert, Christoph, Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin A. Nowak, and Karl Sigmund. 2008. Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations. Biological Theory 3(2): 114–122.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1555-5542en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4554748
dc.description.abstractThe evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenges various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology, to anthropology, social sciences and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free-ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectevolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.subjectcooperationen_US
dc.subjectsocial dilemmasen_US
dc.subjectpublic goods gamesen_US
dc.subjectvoluntary participationen_US
dc.subjectpunishmenten_US
dc.titlePublic Goods with Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populationsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalBiological Theoryen_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available2010-11-15T20:32:23Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114*
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record