Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique

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Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique

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Title: Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2009. Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique. Journal of Economic Theory 144(6): 2354-2371.
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Abstract: We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the belief that motivated them was wrong. In contrast, play may never escape an undesirable self-confirming equilibrium, as the action implied by the mistaken belief does not generate data that contradicts it; escape from the self-confirming equilibrium requires that players do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off-path actions.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.007
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686412
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