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dc.contributor.authorTraulsen, Arne
dc.contributor.authorShoresh, Noam
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T20:45:15Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationTraulsen, Arne, Noam Shoresh, and Martin A. Nowak. 2008. Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 70(5): 1410-1424.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0092-8240en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686798
dc.description.abstractThe idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOrganismic and Evolutionary Biologyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleAnalytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensityen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalBulletin of Mathematical Biologyen_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available2011-01-25T20:45:15Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6*
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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