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dc.contributor.authorNunn, Nathan
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T20:47:07Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationNunn, Nathan. 2007. Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2): 569-600.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686801
dc.description.abstractIs a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.569en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleRelationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Tradeen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionProofen_US
dc.relation.journalQuarterly Journal of Economics -Cambridge Massachusetts-en_US
dash.depositing.authorNunn, Nathan
dc.date.available2011-01-25T20:47:07Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/qjec.122.2.569*
dash.contributor.affiliatedNunn, Nathan
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0002-5101-9866


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