dc.contributor.author | Nunn, Nathan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-25T20:47:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Nunn, Nathan. 2007. Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2): 569-600. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0033-5533 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686801 | |
dc.description.abstract | Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economics | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.569 | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
dc.description.version | Proof | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Quarterly Journal of Economics -Cambridge Massachusetts- | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Nunn, Nathan | |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-25T20:47:07Z | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1162/qjec.122.2.569 | * |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Nunn, Nathan | |
dc.identifier.orcid | 0000-0002-5101-9866 | |